

# Global Water Partnership. Governance Reform Project, phase 1

Review of the governance structure and  
recommendations for improvement.

Judith Sargentini, November 2023.

1 GWP Governance Reform Project, phase 1. November 2023.

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For the Global Water Partnership, Phase 1 of the Governance Reform Project

*The conclusions drawn in this document are my own. Interviews were not recorded and information gathered in is not attributed.*

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# 1. Introduction

The terms of reference for this first phase of the governance reform project did not spell out what caused the crisis GWPO is currently dealing with. Interviewees all pointed at a human resource crisis at headquarters and financial constraints. Those causes do not automatically lead one to conclude to review the governance of the organisation. The crisis does shed light on the underlying unstable decision-making processes that are baked into the structure.

From the interviews, questionnaires and documents studied an organisation emerges that has not felt the need to check its relevance to the signs of the times. Core funding created stability and did not ask a lot of the administration of the organisation. The organisation was probably too small to dedicate capacity to its own internal functioning. The quick turnover of membership in governing bodies, in particular the Steering Committee (SC) prevented conversations on mission, vision and organisation to mature.

The Sponsoring Partners are far removed from the organisation and are currently simply signing off on their responsibilities in a yearly meeting on a 'no objection basis'.

In this construct the Financial Partners Group was the body that stepped up to the plate. A donor has an intrinsic motivation to timely review the use of its support.

## 1.1 Previous initiatives for governance reform

GWPO has been unhappy with its governance structure for at least ten years, if not longer. To give an overview of the proposals done before, I have listed the most influential reports below.

The *Governance and Financing Review for GWP* [Dalberg, November 2014]<sup>1</sup> identified six governance challenges:

1. Weak representation of the Partners in GWP's global governance;
2. Lack of formal representation of the Financing Partners;
3. Multiplicity of oversight committees that creates a burden on senior management and blurs responsibilities;
4. Unclear allocation of roles between the Chair and the Executive Secretary;
5. Complex nomination process that limits the pool of talent available to lead GWP;
6. Weak linkage between the Technical Committee and the rest of the organisation.

The then Steering Committee agreed on the outcomes of the report and decided to prioritise challenges 2,3,5 and 6<sup>2</sup>. Since the Dalberg report of 2014 report after report, addressed the difficulties in the governance system of GWP and GWPO. The analyses seem to find agreement in the Steering Committee, but actual change did not happen.

The 2018 Dalberg report was '*Commissioned by DGIS in partnership with the broader Financing Partners' Group, this evaluation of GWP pursued two objectives: to help inform funding decisions by DGIS, and to provide recommendations on changes needed to strengthen GWP.*'<sup>3</sup>

It identified seven issues related to legitimacy and effectiveness<sup>4</sup>:

1. The role of Partners in GWP's governance is unclear;
2. The legitimacy of decision-making is ill-defined among the different organs;
3. The identification of independent Nominations Committee-members with adequate experience is challenging;
4. The responsibilities of the Secretariat have expanded over time and lack a clear definition;

1 Governance and Financing Review for GWP, Dalberg Nov 2014, p8.

2 According to SP minutes June 2015.

3 Dalberg, Looking back, looking forward. Evaluation of the Global Water Partnership, Nov.2018, p1.

4 Dalberg 2018, p31.

5. Programs are not well integrated in GWP's governance,
6. GWP must tackle unresolved hosting issues,
7. Given the diversity of CWP's, they are complex to integrate in global governance or program delivery efforts.

This second Dalberg report is discussed in the SC-Meeting of December 2018 and in summer 2019 but due to other pressing issues governance reform is not further pursued.<sup>5</sup>

In 2021 SIDA asked Ernst and Young Sweden to perform an efficiency audit with the main objective '*to assess whether SIDAs partner Global Water Partnership Organisation (GWPO) has an appropriate organizational structure with efficient systems and routines in place for managing the activities of Global Water Partnership (GWP) in order to achieve the operational goals.*' EY came to twelve recommendations<sup>6</sup>.

1. We recommend GWPO to, in a future revision of the Statutes, ensure that regulations are in line with SIDAs requirements, with regards to External Audit, Risk Management, Monitoring of activities and Conflict of interest.
2. We recommend GWPO to simplify its organizational structure, especially with regards to streamlining mandate and powers on principal and strategic matters.
3. We recommend GWPO to, in a future revision of the Statutes, include the function of the CEO and further regulate the actions of the Technical Committee.
4. We recommend GWPO to engage the Sponsoring Partners in renewing the Memorandum of Understanding, in order to revitalize the commitment made to GWPO, and to reflect any updated needs resulting from the organization's development.
5. We recommend GWPO to strive for consistency among representatives of the Sponsoring Partners, in order to ensure well-informed decisions at the Annual Meeting.
6. We recommend GWPO to continue allowing digital participation in the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Partners, in order to ensure more experts participating.
7. We recommend GWPO to perform systematic assessments of new members of the Audit and Finance sub-committee, to ensure they are equipped with relevant experience.
8. We recommend GWPO to, in a future revision of the Statutes, include an FPG representative as member of the Steering Committee.
9. We recommend GWPO to update its Administrative Instruction to reflect the changes in signing of delegated authorities.
10. We recommend GWPO to initiate a process to, together with donors, establish a Terms of Reference for the function of the FPG, focusing on donor coordination. In regulating the FPG, it is important to consider risks of duplication of mandate with other entities, as well as making sure that the FPG is not actively involved in the governance of the organization. The Terms of Reference must also correspond to the regulations of core-supporting, as well as program-supporting donors.
11. We recommend GWPO to clearly stipulate the decision-making mandate of Network Specialists/Officers in their Terms of Reference.
12. We recommend GWPO to establish a concrete plan to empower RWP's, if deemed necessary by decentralizing functions from the Global Secretariat.

EY struggled with its recommendations towards the FPG suggesting a seat in the SC (recommendation 8) and at the same time warning against active involvement in the governance of the organisation (recommendation 10).

I have not found references to this report in the minutes of the SC. Instead the SC commissioned its own review of the governance structures to Baker-McKenzie. The following seven proposals for reform were issued:

1. Reform the Nominations Committee
2. Regularise the Financing Partners Group

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5 SP-minutes June 2019.

6 EY audit report 2021, annex I recommendations, page 37.

3. Articulate functions of the Chair
4. Regularise the status of the CEO
5. Refine and augment expectations/obligations of Partners
6. Establish a single supreme decision-making body
7. Establish structure to secure charitable status

None of these proposals ever made it past the drawing board. We need to understand why not and find the stamina to bring changes forwards this time. Four interconnected reasons might be at the cause of this:

1. The leadership was never stable enough to bring decision-making to a conclusion. From 2018 onwards executive-secretaries came and went fast and interim leadership was put in place. Frequent changes of the Chair happened and the turnover in the Steering Committee is high.
2. Oversight was no priority in the day to day work of the organisation and there seems to be a low understanding of what it entails to be an intergovernmental organisation both within the Steering Committee and the organisation.
3. Reforming the governance structure is cumbersome precisely because of the pre-scripted governance structure.
4. Proposals that do not come from within the organisation might not get the support needed to bring them forward. The ownership of evaluation and audit reports did not lie with the organisation. With the exception of the Dalberg report of 2014 and the Baker-McKenzie report of 2021, they were issued by a donor in its routine to evaluate the provided funding.

In this report you will find echoes of the proposals done before, but it is not a full copy-paste. I build on the work done by these renowned consultancy firms. Footnotes have been included as much as possible to guide you to the analyses done before.

## 1.2 How to Change the Rules?

There are 2 documents that are difficult to change: the Statutes and the MoU of the Sponsoring Partners. The rules of conduct for the SC, the by-laws for the NC and by-laws for sub-committees of the SC can be changed by the SC without having to go through other bodies (art 7.8.d of the Statutes). In this report I will distinct proposals that need statutes change from those that can be decided by the SC. I do not take current codes of conduct or by-laws for granted. If needed and possible I will propose two pathways: one allowing for fast changes (the low hanging fruit) and the other one that can only materialise in the longer run. To restore trust in- and within the organisation, I advise the Steering Committee to quickly decide on visible adaptation of the governance structure. I will provide proposals throughout the text.

### 1.2.a Changing Statutes

Article 17 of the statutes set the rules for changing the statutes.<sup>7</sup> As thoroughly explained by Baker-McKenzie<sup>8</sup>, changing the statutes of GWP involves various governing bodies of the Network. After a vote in the SC, the Network Meeting (NM) and the Sponsoring partners have their role to play. The Network Meeting has no demand for quorum. Even with a low turn out a vote will be legit. The Sponsoring Partners in their annual meeting need to agree on the proposed statutes change. After that the clock starts ticking. The change will enter into force a year later unless within nine months of the vote one third of the SP objects.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> GWP/GWPO Statutes, art17.1 'Any amendment to these Statutes may be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the Network Meeting and an unanimous decision of the Meeting of the Sponsoring Partners preceding or subsequent to the said Network Meeting. A proposal for an amendment shall be circulated to the Partners and Sponsoring Partners four weeks in advance of the respective meeting.'

<sup>8</sup> BakerMcKenzie, Advice in respect of potential reforms to Global Water Partnership, 10 September 2021.

<sup>9</sup> Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Global Water Partnership Organisation, art IV.

Together with the legal counsel, we are currently taking stock of what a sponsoring partner needs to do in its own constituency to be allowed to vote in favour of statutes change.<sup>10</sup>

The minutes of the SP-Meeting of 2011 and 2012 mention the statutes change. At the 2011 meeting SPs agreed on the proposed changes and in 2012 the new statutes were deemed in place.<sup>11</sup> As far as we can trace now, the statutes changes of 2011 did not lead to any diplomatic activities. It looks like none of the sponsoring partners went through a national parliamentary scrutiny.<sup>11</sup>

If the organisation would like to change the location of its secretariat, it will need to embark on a statutes change as well.<sup>12</sup>

### 1.3 Benchmark or comparison to other legal entities.

In various reviews a comparison on structure and governance has been made with other international functioning networks. In 2014 Dalberg made an extensive comparison including IUCN, GAVI, WWF, SIWI, Global Fund and CGIAR.<sup>13</sup>

At naissance GWP was modelled after the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR)<sup>14</sup>. CGIAR recently went through a extensive governance review bringing the various research centres closer together. This might be a reason to again take guidance from them, but there is one important difference: CGIAR is an International Organisation not an Intergovernmental one, and it can decide on its own statutes without the need for parliamentary approval.

CGIARs governance is strongly based on representation of its members, the research centres. They hold a general assembly<sup>15</sup> that brings together the research centres and a separate gathering, the partnership forum with System Partners<sup>16</sup> to discuss and exchange views about the CGIAR System and the CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework with the scope set forth in the CGIAR System Framework.<sup>17</sup>

### 1.4 The (dis)advantages of being an intergovernmental organisation

The statutes distinguish between GWPO that has a status of an intergovernmental organisation and the GWP Network that does not.<sup>18</sup> Because not all CWP and RWP hold the same legal

10 Argentina needs to involve the parliament (source email from Argentine embassy to Sweden, 3 Nov 23). The Netherlands needs to bring changes through national parliament. The changes of 2011 were not brought through parliament and the 2002 statutes are the ones archived in the administration of NL MFA. Opinions differ within NL MFA on what would be the consequence of this. Some argue the 2002 statutes still stand, others say that – *if the Kingdom of the Netherlands failed to object in 2011, and if less than one third of the parties have objected, these changes have come into force, also for the Kingdom of the Netherlands. A separate deed of acceptance is then no longer necessary.* (source: Translated from Dutch email correspondence in NL MFA 26 oct 2023)

11 Archive check by GWPO legal counsel at October 31, 2023.

12 Statutes, art12, LOCATION, 'The Secretariat of the Organisation shall be located in Stockholm.'

13 Dalberg 2014. p 43-60.

14 CGIAR, [website 'how we work'](#).

15 CGIAR, [Charter of the CGIAR System Organisation](#), art 5.

16 CGIAR Charter, definitions Art2.N 'System Partners': "CGIAR System Partners" means all organizations external to the CGIAR System that contribute to, or support the delivery of, the CGIAR Strategy and Results Framework. They include national agricultural research and extension systems, universities and advanced research institutes, policy bodies, global and regional fora, intergovernmental organizations, non-government organizations, private-sector companies, farmers/producers and consumers.'

17 CGIAR Charter, definitions Art2.T Partnership Forum.

18 GWP & GWPO Statutes. Article 1. 'LEGAL STATUS. (1) These Statutes regulate the functions and organisation of the Global Water Partnership Network (the Network) and of the Global Water Partnership Organisation (the Organisation), and the relation between the two. (2) The Network does not have legal personality. (3) The Organisation shall possess full legal personality under international law and enjoy

status, if any, the imbalance between the two is large. Oversight of an IGO cannot be done by legally non-existing entities. The meeting of the Sponsoring Partners is therefore needed to close the oversight circle. Effort should be made in reform the Partner Network Meeting into a real General Assembly.

Being an IGO provides access to intergovernmental platforms, such as the UN, that INGOs do not generally have. GWPO apparently has accreditation to ECOSOC as an IGO and, back in 2014, started the journey to be accredited for the UNGA<sup>19</sup>. The status of that application is unknown to me, and I cannot judge whether that accreditation(s) is/are instrumental.

In interviews and via answers to questionnaires CWP and RWP stress that the IGO status allows for easier access to national and regional authorities. The IGO-status is perceived as more neutral than an NGO-status. This is particularly valuable in places where civic space is shrinking. The IGO status is also seen providing 'easier' access to funding.

The IGO-status comes with costs and in an a financially constrained situation that can become a burden. Dropping the status of IGO is an administrative nightmare that, like statutes change, requires SPs to involve their parliaments. The advantages of being an IGO still weight up to the disadvantages, but I would encourage the SC and the secretariat to realise better what obligations and advantages come with it.

## 1.5 South-North divide

The formal leadership of GWPO, the Steering Committee, has a quota for regional representation but, due to the rule that all are members in their own capacity, regional representation is there in spirit only.<sup>20</sup> Four of the 8 sponsoring states are non-European, but none of these are donors<sup>21</sup>. The HQ is based in Sweden and all donors are Western European. However, there are no western-European CWP and RWP functioning within the network. Central- and Eastern European countries, of whom the majority are a Member State of the European Union, are cooperating through the GWP-CEE and CWP. Financing Partners are mostly represented by their agency for development cooperation or their MFA. Do Western European states (and other countries in the Global North) see GWP as a platform for the developing world in which their own IWRM institutions do not need to function? And if so, how can we overcome that inequality? Interviewees from the Global North showed little sensitivity to this regional imbalance.

Some interviewees pointed out that an IGO based in the Global North makes the organisation more trustworthy for (future) donors (from the Global North). Incidental comments were made on limited European representation in the current SC which would not be beneficial for donor trust.

For a future looking GWP, the notion of decolonisation of development cooperation cannot be ignored. The funding imbalance will not be easily overcome. There continues to be a need for donors to be accountable to their tax paying constituency. 'Led from the South and fed from the North' could be a new motto. If the funding imbalance is a current given, overcoming the influence inequality between the Global South and Global North then needs to happen in other bodies of the organisation: the Sponsoring Partners, the Steering Committee, the Network Meeting (and – but this is beyond the scope of the governance reform project) the Secretariat.

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*such capacities as may be necessary to exercise its functions in the fulfilment of the objective set out in Article 2. Its status under the national law of the Host State of the Secretariat will be provided in a Headquarters Agreement between that State and the Organisation.'*

19 [SP-Meeting minutes, 4 Sept 2014](#).

20 The SC-minutes of Sept 2020 demonstrate an interpretation of the position of individual- and regional SC-members: 'While there are generic requirements for the Steering Committee members outlined in the GWP Nomination Committee Bylaws (attached), the guidance from the ES, GWP Chair and others emphasized the following criteria: (i) gender diversity; (ii) a need for a Swedish national/linked in well with Swedish agencies; (iii) the need for private sector background; (iv) that none of those being considered in this decision process had to be from the global south because this need is fulfilled with the Regionally appointed SC members' (underlining added for emphasis).

21 Argentina, Chile, Jordan, Pakistan.

## 2. Oversight bodies reviewed

The oversight of GWPO divides responsibilities between three main bodies: the Sponsoring Partners Meeting, the Steering Committee and the Network Meeting of the Partners. This official sum-up ignores the Financial Partners Group and overestimates the current role of the Network Meeting. The organisation has been depending on stable core funding for a long time provided by (exclusively) western European donors.

For an organisation that was established in 1996 '*as a virtual organisation with a minimum of formal structure*'<sup>22</sup> it now has so many formal structures that it is held back in its need to reform.

The size of GWPO, meaning the secretariat, does not legitimise the heavy weight governance structure currently in place. When we include the regional and Country Water Partnerships the picture colours differently both in capacity and budget. The implementing power of RWPs and CWP<sub>s</sub> is not very well reflected in the current governance system.

The speedy turnover of membership in governing bodies, in particular the SC prevents structural conversations on mission, vision and organisation.

The Sponsoring Partners are far removed from the organisation and currently simply signing off on their responsibilities in a yearly meeting on a 'no objection basis'.

The sheer existence of the FPG might also have eroded the feeling of responsibility of members of the SC over the organisations' budget. Why scrutinise the budget thoroughly if there are always the FGP, SIDA control cycle and the Sponsoring Partners Meeting to take decisions? Three entities, and if we include the secretariat four, that can point fingers at each other or wash their hands of the matter.

There is an unbalance in population of the various oversight bodies. The members of the SC are appointed on the basis of their (international) career and they often hold a list of governing and academic experiences. For the SC a procedure with a Nominations Committee is in place. The representatives of the Sponsoring Partners present at the yearly meeting are mostly diplomats from the respective embassies in Stockholm and at the Financing Partners Meeting civil servants from MFAs or development cooperation entities meet. If one would draw a real power organigram the position of the informal FGP would be at the same level or even above the SP-Meeting. In theory the decision-making flow follows hierarchy but in practise – taking into account the people that populate these bodies – there is a dip after the SC. This does not help to create mutual trust between the bodies.

The way forward is to clarify what entity actually should function as The Board to the organisation. The most logical body for that role is the SC. To be able to play that role to the full it needs to be empowered in its role and practically be held accountable.

### 2.1 The Network, the partners, CWP<sub>s</sub> and RWPs.

The vibrant part of the GWP is its network of regional and country based water partnerships and partners. The organisational strength of the CWP<sub>s</sub> and RWPs differs enormously, but the fact that these multi-stakeholder play a vital role is evident. The second Dublin principle may serve as an inspiration for the governance of GWP and GWPO: '*Water development and management should*

22 'The Global Water Partnership (GWP) is a "reinforced network" of organisations interested in the sustainable management of freshwater resources in developing countries. It was established in 1996 in response to the worsening water shortage in large parts of the developing world and to the perceived lack of international leadership in water. It is modelled on the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) as a virtual organisation with a minimum of formal structure'. Holmberg, "Knowledge-intensive networks for development: the case of the Global Water Partnership." Human Systems Management, vol.17, no.1, pp. 39-47, 1998.

be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy makers at all levels.<sup>23</sup>

In the mid-term review for the GWP strategy 2020-2025, the value of the network was described as follows: there is '*consensus that GWP's global-regional-local model is one of the key strengths of the organisation. However, it needs to improve goal setting, responsibilities, coordination, knowledge sharing, and funding allocation between the global organisation and regional water partnerships. A better integration of regional best practices into GWP's global platform would enhance efforts to advance the global agenda.*'<sup>24</sup>

For the network to be really interlinked, cooperation at the executing- and the oversight level should be routine: meaning real regional representation at the SC and regional involvement at the management level.

### 2.1.a Partnership, membership

The term 'Partners' might have been chosen on purpose instead of the more common 'members'. It suggests a more loose relationship but it also suggests equality. The Network is large but only loosely connected. All Partners have voting rights at the yearly Network Meeting (NM), but the participation is low. Information sharing and working methods with intermediaries in the secretariat suggest a top down approach. This could have been enhanced through the centrally provided core funding. That might have diverted attention away from a bottom up approach that comes naturally with a network. It is difficult to judge the current value of the partnership from a paper exercise, but the set up for joining and leaving allows for easy access and no exit.

### 2.1.b Joining the Network

All entities worldwide (not necessarily legally established) can join the Network. All partners are direct 'members' of the GWP. The structures in between, the CWP and RWP, are hardly recognised in the governance structure (more on that below). Joining the Network is easy. You fill in a form online pledging to concur with the principles of GWP and the ex-sec signs off on the membership. For potential partners from areas where a CWP or an RWP are existing, a check is run by them.<sup>25</sup> Entities from regions without CWP or RWP reach out directly to the GWPO. In practice this means that NGOs and private companies from Western Europe and North America are not gathered in a WP.

### 2.1.c Leaving the Network

Leaving the Network voluntarily is as easy as writing an email. But do partners voluntarily leave? What is the incentive to officially withdraw from the Network? Direct relations between GWPO and the individual entity are scarce; membership fees do not exist and other regular moments of recognition for or reflection on the partnership seem to be limited. Chances are that entities that seek to exist never send in their letter of cancellation.

Expelling a partner needs to be done via the annual – not well visited – Network Meeting. I assume no entity was ever expelled from the network. This structure of entering and exiting reminds me of Hotel California: '*you can check out any time you like, but you can never leave.*'<sup>26</sup> Admittedly biased I ran a check on the 18 entries from The Netherlands: 5 of the 18 were non-existent; 4 (of which 2 are also covered under 'non-existent') were actually from one university.<sup>27</sup> It could be that partners in states that do not have a CWP are less engaged and therefore those data are more

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23 IWRM Action Hub, [IWRM explained](#).

24 Anthesis, [Midterm review of the GWP Strategy 2020-2025](#), 12 Oct 2022.

25 [GWP Policy on partners](#): '*All applications submitted online to GWPO are automatically shared with the RWP Secretariats, who are responsible for making a consultation with the CWPs or other actors in order to verify the accuracy of the information in the application. Once the application has gone through the GWP and RWP filters, it is submitted to the Executive Secretary of GWPO. For applications coming from countries outside of the 13 RWPs, GWPO makes its own assessment.*'

26 '*Relax, said the night man, We are programmed to receive, You can check out any time you like. But you can never leave!*', [Hotel California](#), The Eagles, 1976.

27 See annex, stocktaking exercise of Netherlands partnership of GWP.

contaminated.

Organisations often use fees to refresh its membership. GWP statutes do not allow that, and the administration that would come with collecting fees, can be costly. GWP does need to build something in its structures to regularly ask partners to reconfirm their membership.<sup>28</sup> That could be a yearly written statement or answering to a questionnaire. Failure to answer to that request for – for instance – three years will lead to cancellation of the partnership at the next Network Meeting.

## 2.1.d Position of the Water Partnerships

The Policy on Partners dating from 2016, states that water partnerships are *an 'administrative functional part of the management of the Network but are not themselves Partners.'*<sup>29</sup> As a consequence CWP and RWP hold no voting rights at the annual Network Meeting.

In an earlier memorandum on the legal aspects of the relationship between GWP and RWPs we read the following: *'In the view of the Secretariat, RWPs and CWP should not be regarded as Partners of the GWP Network in themselves. They are groups of Partners operating in a specific geographical area as the functional part of the network in that area.'*<sup>30</sup>

Whether or not this is still the current practice, the ruling runs contrary to the current statutes that state that *'Regional and Country Water Partnerships become a part of the Network provided they meet the conditions for accreditation as adopted by the Steering Committee.'*<sup>31</sup> There is no other way to be part of the network then through partnership status. There are no SC-rulings that recognised RWPs and CWP have to go through other types of accreditation.

The water partnerships are neither meat or fish. In the statutes they are seen as an *'integral part of the Network but'* at the same time *'remain autonomous organisations.'*<sup>32</sup>

Viewed top down these 'autonomous' RWPs and CWP are administrative entities of the GWPO that have not been incentivised to establish themselves as a legal entity. But if we look at it bottom-up the CWP and the RWPs are the functioning entities of the network. They have- or are searching for a legal status, have their own oversight bodies and are, or want to, tap into direct funding. It is rather disempowering to withhold voting rights from the entities that are the most active in the network. The statutes do decree that a representative of RWPs is part of the SC, which suggests they are a substantive entity.

This limbo-situation can easily be overcome. The definition of Partnership in the statutes ('any entity, except individuals'<sup>33</sup>) is wide and does not prohibit other networks to join.<sup>34</sup> The SC has the mandate to change the Policy on Partners. I advise they do so by actively recognising the partner

28 Statutes, Art14, *'FINANCE. (1) The operation of the Organisation shall be financed by voluntary contributions and donations from governments and others. Other sources of financing may be sought by the Steering Committee provided that they are compatible with the objectives of the Network and the Organisation. (2) The Partners and the Sponsoring Partners shall not be required to provide financial support to the Network or to the Organisation beyond voluntary contributions.'*

29 The Policy on Partners is not dated and has no page numbering. I expect it to orgine from 2016 because that is in the name when you download the file.

30 GWP/GWPO Governance, Crucial Defining Principles and Documents, November 2010, APPENDIX 21- LEGAL ASPECTS RELATIONSHIP GWP/RWP, POSITION PAPER, Status of Regional Water Partnerships and Country Water Partnerships.

31 Statutes, art5.2: *'Partners may be organised on a regional and country basis in Water Partnerships as the functional part of the Network in that region or country. Such Regional and Country Water Partnerships become a part of the Network provided they meet the conditions for accreditation as adopted by the Steering Committee. [...]'*

32 Statutes art5.2.

33 Statutes art3.1.

34 The [online form](#) to fill for Partnership does not demand the entity to be a legal entity. This would suggest CWP that are not legally established can be granted voting rights.

status of RWPs and CWP in the Partner Policy.<sup>35</sup> The status of Partner will create double representation. The current statutes grant the individual partner voting rights at the Network Meeting. Adding CWP to that, will theoretically double the vote of an individual Partner. Representation in the Network Meeting is as low as two percent of the membership, therefore that is a risk worth taking. In order not to create a triple representation, RWPs, a partner according to the statutes, should not be granted voting rights in the NM. We can include RWPs in the direct governance by increasing their presence in the SC and creating an extended Management Team, as is proposed elsewhere in this report.

### 2.1.e One size does not fit all: legal entity of CWP and RWPs

The entities in the Network all have to comply with their national legislation. Trying to squeeze all CWP and RWPs in a one-size-fits-all construct will not work. For most of them it will be easier to tap into direct funding if they have some sort of a legal status. With core funding phasing out, the network needs to get ready to administer program- and project funding. Agreements between legal entities (f/e GWPO and a RWP with an NGO-status) demand contracting between entities in the Network. That will automatically clarify ownership and accountability between HQ and a region. Even when a CWP/RWP holds a legal status, hosting by another legal entity can still be a solution to ensure service delivery.

A legal entity has a pre-scripted oversight structure of some sorts. That increases representation and accountability at all levels including at the Partners Network Meeting. We should encourage CWP and RWPs to find the legal status that suits them.

#### Proposals:

- Adapt the Policy on Partners to actively recognise the partnership status of CWP and RWPs and allow CWP vote in the Network Meeting. Clarify why RWPs should not have voting rights.
- Decrease the South-North influence inequality through empowering CWP involvement in the Network Meeting.
- Assist CWP and RWPs with finding the legal status that suits them.
- Ask partners regularly to confirm partnership and proceed to cancellation after a three years of non-communication. Include this rule into the Policy on Partners.

#### Proposals that require statutes change:

- Move the acceptance of new Partners from the executive-secretary to the SC.

## 2.2. Sponsoring Partners

The meeting of the Sponsoring Partners is the highest body in the organisation.<sup>36</sup> According to the statutes it appoints the Chair, members of the SC, the executive- secretary and it signs off on the annual audit reports.<sup>37</sup> The Memorandum of Understanding that establishes GWPO as an intergovernmental organisation is a short document of five articles that do not touch upon the governance architecture.<sup>38</sup> The meeting takes place in person in Stockholm and SPs are often represented by a representative of their embassy in Sweden.<sup>39</sup> It is run on a 'no objection basis'.<sup>40</sup> The preparation for these meetings is done in the capital of the Member State. Diplomats present

<sup>35</sup> Statutes, art3.6 'The Steering Committee may further clarify the concept and position of Partners through the Policy on Partners.'

<sup>36</sup> Current Sponsoring Partners: Argentina, Chile, Denmark, Hungary, Jordan, The Netherlands, Pakistan, Sweden, The World Bank, World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

<sup>37</sup> Statutes, art4 and art10.

<sup>38</sup> [Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of the Global Water Partnership Organisation](#).

<sup>39</sup> Between 2011 and 2022 Denmark, Jordan, World Bank and World Meteorological Organisation missed 6 to 8 of the SP-Meetings.

<sup>40</sup> [Minutes SP-Meeting 2011](#), agendapoint 6.

at the meeting have their talking points, but not necessarily the mandate to go off script. A Sponsoring Partner that is not a donor has not much of a stake in scrutinising the audit reports. There is no incentive to be critical on the presented figures. The appointment of members of the SC is based upon a proposals by the NC. Over the years the SP have been in agreement with the nominations put forward.

There seem to be no regular contacts between SPs and the GWPO (SC and HQ) in between meetings and information shared with the members is limited. Apparently regular contacts between the capitals of the SPs and GWPO have been lacking in the recent years.

Due to the composition of the SP and the low frequency of information sharing, it is only in theory that the SP-Meeting is the highest body of the organisation. A like minded and consensus driven oversight body is comforting for an organisation, but that comfort is not always at its best interest. When staff at the GWPO-secretariat is occupied with the day to day service delivery it is the oversight-body(ies) that need to be forward looking. The current set-up diminishes the role the Sponsoring Partners can play for GWP. An SP could be helpful in opening doors of influence and should be an ally in policy influencing at the highest level. For that to succeed the moral role of the SP, as place for informed conversation on international developments in water management needs to improve and relationships needs to be reactivated. Rules of conduct or by-laws for the SP-Meeting could be helpful to clarify interaction between the various oversight bodies in the GWP/GWPO.

With the improved strategic role of the SP-Meeting, I advise to allow them to move their final oversight role to the Network Meeting. That will make the Steering-Committee more accountable to the NM. It requires a statutes change to move the approval of financial statements, the audit report and the appointment of members of the SC to the NM. If there is no appetite for such statutes change, I propose a lighter version in which the SP-Meeting functions as a General Assembly instead of a supervisory board. For a SP in the form of a GA it is more logical to function on the basis of 'no objection'.

I advice GWPO to, at least for now, continue as an intergovernmental organisation, and in that light not to touch the current MoU until the organisation is stabilised and has proven its right to exist. Opening up the MoU may lead to reconsidering of sponsorship.

## 2.2.a Enlarging the group of SPs

To join the group of Sponsoring Partners is according to the statutes a rather easy process. A state or an IGO can simply apply for membership and a decision is taken at the annual SP-Meeting. The state or IGO then becomes party to the original MoU.<sup>41</sup> This has not happened since the signing of the MoU in January 2002. At least two of the original invitees have over the years considered joining, Japan and South Africa.<sup>42</sup> Japan needs parliamentary approval and foresees difficulties. This has put that process on hold. Earlier South Africa was told to wait for changes in the GWP governance to take place. In 2011 conversations were ongoing with Brazil and China to become SP.<sup>43</sup> Renewed efforts should be put into growing the list of SPs. African representation is particularly desirable. An enlarged group of SPs holds several advantages: a more global

41 Statutes, Art4(3) '*Other States and Intergovernmental Organisations may become Sponsoring Partners, subject to a decision by the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Partners and after accession to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Global Water Partnership Organisation. Such membership is open to: a) Other States, which are Partners of the Network and have a record of support for the objective of the Network; b) Other Intergovernmental Organisations, which are Partners of the Network, have a global role in water affairs, and have a record of support for the objective of the Network.'*

42 Originally invited by Sweden to become SPs: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Japan, Jordan, The Netherlands, Pakistan, South Africa, Spain, The United Kingdom, The World Bank, The World Meteorological Organisation.

43 [Minutes SP-Meeting June 2011](#).

representation, access to international decision-making processes through their diplomatic channels, funding opportunities and – important for a governance reform – developing the SP-Meeting into a General Assembly instead of another supervisory board.

#### Proposals:

- Do not open up the current MoU if you want to continue as an intergovernmental organisation.
- Explore the willingness of the SP to move oversight tasks to the Network Meeting.
- Enlarge the group of Sponsoring Partners with a priority on Africa.
- Invite UN-Water to become a SP instead of a member in the SC.
- Change perspective in the SP away from a supervisory board towards a general assembly.
- Revamp relationships between the executive-secretary and the individual Sponsoring Partners at the level of the capitals.
- Improve frequency and intensity of the exchange between SC, SP and the HQ upscaling the conversation to strategy and policy.
- Consider formulating by-laws for the SP-Meeting to stipulate roles and procedures beyond the statutes.

#### Proposals that require statutes change:

- Make the Steering-Committee more accountable to the partners by moving the final oversight role of the SP (approval of financial statements, the audit report, appointment of members of the SC) to the Network Meeting.

### **2.3 Empowering The Network Meeting**

There are currently two gatherings that can be seen a General Assembly:

1. The Network Meeting of the Partners is the GA to the GWP.
2. The Sponsoring Partners Meeting is the GA for the GWPO.

Both meetings suffer from a lack of participation. The Network Meeting (NM) is a forward looking body, where the SP-Meeting looks back. According to the statutes the NM adopts the strategic direction of the Network, but not of the GWPO; it can comment on the financial statements, but does not have the right to approve them.<sup>44</sup> If the GWPO is the secretariat of the Network, not allowing the Network to actually decide on its strategic directions is awkward.

The NM in 2022 was organised as a hybrid meeting, coinciding the Regional Days, a gathering of RWPs and GWPO. It was not mandatory to be a registered GWP Partner to join. I have not been able to locate minutes and participants lists for this meeting. The NM seems to have lead a very informal life within the GWP and its already limited role as an oversight body is not recognised.

In the past the NM was combined with something called the Consulting Partners Meeting, '*an open meeting where individuals and institutions interested in IWRM matters meet and discuss in a workshop atmosphere. The meetings are organised by the GWPO and include lectures, seminars*

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44 Statutes, Art9, 'THE NETWORK MEETING. (1) The Partners shall hold an Annual Network Meeting on the convocation of the Steering Committee, unless otherwise decided by the Network Meeting. An extraordinary Network Meeting shall be convened:a) When the Steering Committee finds it necessary; b) Upon the request of one fifth of the Partners. (2) At the Annual Network Meeting the Partners shall: a) Adopt the strategic directions and policies for the Network;b) Recommend action to be taken by the Steering Committee on the basis of the adopted strategic directions and policies; c) Comment on the yearly activity report and the yearly financial statement of the Steering Committee; d) Consider and decide on the expulsion of Partners from the Network, after recommendation of the Steering Committee. (3) The Network Meeting shall be governed by rules proposed by the Steering Committee and adopted by the Network Meeting. (4) The Partners may hold the Annual Network Meeting or extraordinary meetings through distant communication in accordance with rules established by the Network Meeting'.

and discussion groups. Participation at CP meetings is not restricted to GWP Partners. No formal decisions binding on GWP are taken at the CP meetings.<sup>45</sup>

It would be logical to combine the NM to build it into the annual event of the year. It should be made attractive for International Organisations that are currently invited as observers to the SC, specialists from the capitals of the SPs and the FPs. At such a gathering national and regional representatives meet and mingle with each-other and with SPs, FPs, observers, SC and the secretariat. The meeting can be split in a open for all seminar were the latest developments in the field are discussed and a (statutorily obliged) general assembly where Partners with voting rights fulfil their annual oversight duties.

By-laws for the NM, dating from 2006 and forgotten, are not sufficiently clarifying the rights of the Partners in the NM. In 2010, a document trying to clarify the governance, concluded this: *'the Network Meeting does not operate formally. It has never been formally convened.'*<sup>46</sup> That is not in line with the statutes that stipulate that *'the Partners shall hold an Annual Network Meeting [...]*<sup>47</sup>. To empower the NM the SC should formulate new rules to interpretate the mandate of this meeting of Partners.<sup>48</sup> Approving of annual plans (not part of the SP mandate), nominations of new SC-members and the audited reports could, for instance, be brought before the Network Meeting and then presented to the SPs with the blessing of the NM. The *'strategic directions and policies for the Network'* as mentioned in the statutes can be interpreted in such a way that it involves the directions and policies of the secretariat. Increased transparency will help restore trust. It is a simple question of political will. To bring the two meetings closer together the SP-Meeting should be scheduled right after the Network Meeting.

The IGO-status demands for the Sponsoring Partners to continue in their role as final oversight body, but to enable the Network to govern itself, the NM needs to gain importance. If, in the future the organisation would like to reform itself from an IGO to an International Organisation, a well-functioning general assembly needs to be able to take over the oversight role from the SP.

#### Proposals:

- Organise the Network Meetings according to the statutes: yearly. Conclude discussions with a minuted decision to grow a culture of accountability in the Network.
- Use the mandate of the SC to reformulate the rules of the Network Meeting to empower that meeting of partners, to make it function more like a general assembly.
- Let the SP-Meeting follow close to the NM.
- Organise an annual event of the year on latest developments attractive for a wide audience and combine it with a Network Meeting / General Assembly (where all oversight bodies meet consecutively).

## **2.4 The Steering Committee**

### **2.4.a The desired role of the Steering Committee.**

The Steering Committee should function as the Supervisory Board of GWPO. We need to create a organisational culture in which all bodies within the GWP, the SP, the Network, the Secretariat, the informal FGP – and not to forget the members of the SC themselves, embrace the SC as the leading body in the network and organisation. For that to function we need to clarify know who does what and with what mandate.

45 GWP/GWPO Governance, Crucial Defining Principles and Documents, November 2010. Appendix 4, Network Meeting by-laws adopted in 2006. This document is not publicly available on the website and probably forgotten.

46 GWP/GWPO Governance, Crucial Defining Principles and Documents, November 2010, page IV.

47 Statutes art9.1.

48 Statutes art9.3.

A Supervisory Board is not involved in day to day work. The board monitors the executive-secretary /CEO, acts as employer, advises (and not instructs) the ex-sec/CEO, and networks in a servant way with stakeholders of the organisation, in line with the organisation's stakeholder management, and in consultation with that ex-sec/CEO. In executing its duty, the members of the Supervisory Board operate in a team-oriented manner and function in constant dialogue with each other. The Chair of the Supervisory Board directs this process. A Supervisory Board demonstrates a so-called 'professional laziness' but it is present. It meets (virtually) 4 to 5 times a year. It invests in team-building and members actually know each other.

For a long time the organisation did not need to worry about money. Core funding was secured. But the signs that this was not going to last, were there. Were the members of the SC fully aware of their role in securing the financial stability of the organisation? The annual audit is signed off by the Sponsoring Partners and the relationship with Financing Partners is held by the Secretariat. The division of labour in the organisation blurs the view on who is primarily responsible: the SC. The SC needs to adapt to be accountable to program- and project funding. A donor wants to see the practical results. The SC needs to judge whether the proposed program fits the mission of the organisation, and how to finance the day-to-day working of a secretariat out of the overhead. The frequency of SC-Meeting (leaving aside ad-hoc meetings in this time of crisis) is on the low side for a board. The response rate of individual SC-members to the questionnaire send out for this governance reform process has been low. This suggests a limited sense of belonging with at least a part of the SC.

#### **2.4.b The current composition of the Steering Committee**

The statutes art 7.2 allow a SC of 11 to 21 members and the rules of conduct for the SC clarifies that the current routine is 17 members. For an organisation with an annual budget of less than 10 millions Euro and around 30 FTE staff it is a sizeable board.

Four ex-officio members, according to article 7.2 and 7.3 are given: the Chair, the executive-secretary, the chair of the technical committee and one representative of a RWP.<sup>49</sup>

A fifth ex-officio member, the Chair of UN Water, or its replacement, is optional. Article (7.3) is formulated in such a way ('*is entitled to*') that the choice to join the GWP-SC is taken out of the hands of GWP and put in those of UN Water. Therefore this member cannot be counted upon for oversight duties but does count for quorum.<sup>50</sup>

For the rest of the members up to 11 to 21, there are rules in the by-laws of the Nominations Committee. The rules of conduct of the SC itself do not further specify the composition of the SC. It would be more logical to arrange for the composition of the SC in its own by-laws.

The by-laws of the NC specify the further composition of the SC as decided by the Sponsoring Partners<sup>51</sup>:

- Five ex officio members in accordance with article 7(2) of the Statutes.
- Six appointed members nominated from regional candidates.
- Six appointed members nominated from global candidates.

49 Statutes art7.2: '*The Steering Committee shall consist of a minimum of eleven and a maximum of twenty-one members, as decided by the Meeting of the Sponsoring Partners. The Steering Committee shall include, as ex officio members, the Chair, the Executive Secretary and the chair of the Technical Committee.*' Art 7.3 '*The Steering Committee shall also include one member representing all Regional Water Partnerships appointed in accordance with the procedure adopted by the Steering Committee.*'

50 Satutes art7.3: '*The Chair of UN Water [...] is entitled to participate as a member of the Steering Committee.*'

51 By-laws Nominations Committee Art 3.1.1 Composition of and Nomination to the SC.

The World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Water Council are invited as observers to the SC.<sup>52</sup> Their presence is not regular. I will propose a way forward with this construct further down.

Recently the FGP asked to have their status in the SC changed from voting member to observer.

#### **2.4.c Regional representation in the SC**

In 2015 the composition of the SC was adapted to include the current six regional candidates. Each region proposes a female and a male candidate to the NC that then selects one of them keeping in mind the balanced composition of the full SC. The regions alternate. The candidates are rooted in their regions but do not hold an official position.

Over the years opinions differed on the need to have a Steering Committee leaning more towards individual representation or direct representation. Fear voiced in some interviews that direct representation of RWPs (for instance by regional chairs) into the SC would chip away attention from the more strategic global debate and narrow it to self-existence.

Currently RWPs receive a small yearly core funding from GWPO, but we should expect predict the end of core funding and the turn around to program- or project funding. That would not only lift the articulated fear out of the way, but actually increases the need to involve RWPs in the oversight of the GWPO: after all the projects need to be executed in their regions. By including direct RWP-representation in the SC a mutual accountability between RWP and GWPO is created for the delivery of projects for which funding is administrated in Stockholm.

The current NC by-laws decree that a chair of a RWP cannot be member of the SC.<sup>53</sup> This should then apply the other way around as well: a member of the SC that is appointed as an official in a CWP or RWP should step down from the SC. The current SC has at least one member in this double role. Instead of obeying to these by-laws I propose to change them and embrace stronger direct representation of RWPs in the SC.

#### **2.4.d Voting in the SC.**

Over the years views have differed over voting rights within the Steering Committee. In March 2023 the legal counsel issued a memo explaining the meaning of an ex-officio member and taking stock of decisions made on voting rights.<sup>54</sup> 'Ex-officio' means one holds a position in a board representing another entity. This is a form of representation that fits a network. I concur with the conclusion that all members of the SC currently have voting rights. Neither the statutes nor current by-laws and Rules of Conduct exempt members from voting. The notion that the Chair should be non-voting popped up sometimes in minutes of the SP-Meeting. Depriving a chair from voting is disempowering to that position within a board. It can also lead to a mental withdraw from the person holding such a position. In fact lower status membership can lead to disengagement by those singled out.

The representative of UN-Water is a member of the SC and therefore has voting rights unless the SC consciously decides otherwise and lays that down in by-laws<sup>55</sup>. I advise not to do so. The statutes decree this particular external entity to be part of the SC, denying that function voting rights does not fit with the spirit of the current statutes. It is difficult to distinguish a non-voting member from an observer and depriving someone from voting rights does not help ownership.

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52 GWP website, [sub page Steering-Committee](#).

53 By-laws NC Art3.1.5. 'Persons employed by GWPO, regional water partnerships, or country water partnerships are not eligible for nomination. Elected officials such as Regional and country water partnership chairs and Council/SC members may be nominated provided that they step down from the relevant position should they be appointed to the SC.'

54 [Ex-Officio status within GWP's Steering Committee](#), memo by the legal counsel on request of the SC, March 11, 2023.

55 The draft minutes of the SP-Meeting of June 2023 show a powerpoint slide that states that UN-Water holds no voting rights. I have not seen that in earlier documents.

Whether you would like to continue having another IGO in your SC is a different question. In the current situation I would bring a board back to its core. UN-Water would be a logical Sponsoring Partner.

Governance within GWP is complex as it is. There is a need for the Steering Committee to step up its oversight role and start functioning as a board. Also for that reason a chair should have voting rights. The executive-secretary, that doubles as the CEO, should not be entitled to a vote. This function is reporting to the SC and should – obviously – not take part in decision making on its own functioning.

In order to silence this debate, I propose to clarify in SC by-laws that the executive-secretary is not voting implying that all others are.

#### **2.4.e Proposal for the Composition of the Steering Committee**

The size of the Steering Committee is out of balance with the size of the budget and the staffing of the organisation. I advise to drastically trim down the SC to be more in sync with the size of the organisation and the role of a supervisory board and a general assembly (which role can be fulfilled by both the Network Meeting and the SP-Meeting. I have touched upon that elsewhere) There are 2 roads to travel, depending on the feasibility of changing the statutes.

The turnover of leadership in GWPO is too high to establish stable oversight and benefit from institutional memory. Prolonging the term of office for members of the SC from 3 to 4 years will help slow this process down. This needs a statutes change.

The NC by-laws decree that a member of the SC that seeks a second term is scrutinised in the first term *'in the same manner as those of new candidates.'*<sup>56</sup> I advise to drop that rule. A member that is available for a second term helps lowering the speed of leadership turnover. It is common practice for boards to hold a regular self-evaluation to discuss how the team is operating but also to hold each other accountable for their individual performance. To wait for 3 years with such performance until a next nomination process, with strict rules of confidentiality, will not improve performance (and keeps under performance out of view). A second term is not an automatism,. Therefore a lighter scrutiny, official nomination and appointment procedure still needs to take place. The possibility to part ways with a non-functioning member needs to stay in place.

In a network (that is basically an association of members) with a well functioning general assembly and a CEO that runs the day to day business, a supervisory board functions at a distance and initiates discussions on long term strategy. It taps into other resources for inspiration on mission and vision. In a network accountability towards a constituency is key. A board - therefore - needs to be accountable and – as it can source from the well of knowledge of the network– it can be lean and mean. A smaller board forces its members to engage; it is easier to hold the quorum; easier to stay out of the day-to-day work; forces high over strategic conversations and saves money.

I advise to stop having regular observers in SC-Meetings. They take away the focus a Board needs to put on its oversight tasks. When the setting is aimed at finding consensus to prevent voting, it is difficult to distinguish between members and observers that join the conversation (because that is what they are there for, not to sit in silence and observe). A yearly conference dedicated to IWRM-policies connected to the Network Meeting and/or the SP-Meeting would be a more fitting and inspirational place to invite adjoining IGOs and NGOs.

##### Option 1, with statutes change.

The preferred option – involving statutes change – would be a Steering Committee of 5 to 9

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<sup>56</sup> NC by-laws 3.1.6 [...] *'As renewal of an SC member's appointment is not automatic, the NC shall consider the merits and qualifications of eligible past SC members in the same manner as those of new candidates in the nomination process.'*

members with the following staffing: chair, executive-secretary, chair of the TEC, treasurer and one to five representatives of RWPs. The Chair and treasurer would be the only members functioning at in their individual capacity. The members representing an RWP (their chair or another member of their oversight-body) are, different from the current situation, holding a position in their region, are mandated by their RWP and also accountable towards that body. The RWPs would change position after one term (of 4 years).

No observers or non-voting members are foreseen. The SC would be accountable to the Network Meeting that will function as a General Assembly and is the platform for wider discussions in the Network.

#### Option 2, without statutes change.

The fast-track option – not involving statutes change – would be to bring the SC down to 13 members. According to the statutes the minimum composition is 11. UN-Water is there on its own merits, influences the quorum, but is not to accountable to the Network or the SP and will not take up regular governing tasks. A composition of 13 members SC will give leeway to continue to function when a member unexpectedly drops off.

The composition could be as follows:

- Five ex-officio members according to the statutes (chair, ex-sec, TEC chair, representative of a RWP and chair of UN-Water).
- Eight members representing a donor, originating from private sector and NGOs and 5 RWPs (making up six RWPs in total). To select the RWPs the current 3 years rotation scheme can continue to function.<sup>57</sup>

The statutes decree that the chair and members of the SC function in a personal capacity<sup>58</sup> but to increase the accountability towards the network and the RWPs, we should be aiming at clearer representation of part of the membership. By including direct representation from the RWPs, meaning that these members take their seat ex-officio, we create accountability by circumventing the statutes. After all, these members are being held accountable in their region. We can clarify which members continue to '*serve in a personal capacity*' via the Rules of Conduct of the SC. The Chair, and the members originating from private sector and NGO can help ensure a certain neutrality towards regional interests. The member representing a donor, should be willing to vote. If that is not feasible, I advise to include a treasurer in a personal capacity.

The Sponsoring Partners decide on the size of the SC. They can rule on the composition in their June 2024 meeting and it can take effect from January 2025.

The composition change of the SC will lead to a review of the composition of the various sub-committees as well. The SC has full freedom to do so.<sup>59</sup> As these sub-committees do not influence governance beyond the functioning of the SC itself, I do not propose a way forward.

#### Proposals:

- Decrease the size of the SC to a maximum of 13 and propose this for decision to the next SP-Meeting.<sup>60</sup>
- Increase the frequency of (virtual) SC-Meetings.
- Review the rules of conduct for the SC, rename them by-laws to be in line with others internal arrangements and break them up into 2 different products: a) by-laws specifying the way of working and composition. b) a code of good-governance formulating ethics.

57 Recorded in the Minutes of the SC-Meeting of December 2019.

58 Statutes art6.3: '*The Chair shall serve in her or his personal capacity*' and 7.5 dito for SC.

59 Statutes art7.8.c '*Create and appoint such other committees or groups as it finds necessary for the performance of its functions, which may include members of the Steering Committee and other individuals as appropriate.*'

60 GWP statutes, art10.6: '*The Meeting of the Sponsoring Partners shall decide the number of members of the Steering Committee within the limits set out in Article 7, paragraph 2.*'

- Clarify in the new SC by-laws that the ex-sec does not hold voting rights in the SC but all other members do.
- Lift the composition the SC from the NC by-laws to the reviewed SC by-laws.
- Include regular self-evaluation to the by-laws of the SC.
- exclude the SC-observers from the SC and find another forum to connect with them.

Change the by-laws of the Nominations Committee as follow:

- Move the composition of the SC to the rules of conduct of the SC.
- Erase art 3.1.5 that forbids officials of CWP and RWP to become member of the SC.
- Align the term of mandate of the chair of regional chairs (an ex-officio position representing all Regional Water Partnerships) with the other members by raising it from 2 to 3 years.
- Lift the rule that the search for a Chair needs to be done with an external recruiter.

Proposals that require statutes change:

- Lower the size of the SC to 5 to 9 members.
- Prolong the term of office for members of the SC to 4 years.
- Change art7.5 to erase the rule that '*members of the Steering Committee shall serve in their personal capacity*' and allow for stronger representation of RWPs.
- Invite UN-Water to become a SP instead of a member in the SC.

## 2.5 Role of the Chair and the Executive-Secretary

To be effective as a small organisation with a board consisting of volunteers one needs to empower the executive-secretary. The executive-secretary is the spider in the web; the full-timer that runs the secretariat as a CEO, the visionary leader, the main stakeholder-manager and the primary spokesperson of an organisation. This function channels all information in an organisation or network and is therefore highly influential. To keep the balance right, the executive-secretary should not have voting rights in a board.

A Chair of a supervisory board is a different sort of leader. This function is not involved in day-to-day business and does not hold executive responsibilities. The Chair is the employer of the ex-sec, guards the long-term mission of an organisation, stimulates strategic debates, functions as the sparring partner of the ex-sec and is primarily responsible for oversight over the organisation.

The statutes of GWPO describe the role of the Chair<sup>61</sup> the SC<sup>62</sup> and the executive-secretary<sup>63</sup> very

61 Statutes art6, 'THE GLOBAL WATER PARTNERSHIP CHAIR. (1)The Global Water Partnership Chair (the Chair) is the head and spokesperson for the Network as well as the Organisation. The Chair represents the Network and the Organisation in all forums, and chairs the Network Meeting and the meetings of the Steering Committee. [...] (3)The Chair shall serve in her or his personal capacity.'

62 Satutes a7, 'THE STEERING COMMITTEE. (1)The executive body of the Organisation is the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee develops, steers and organises the work of the Organisation and guides the co-operation between the Partners within the Network. The Steering Committee shall facilitate for the Network to attain its objective and shall implement the strategic directions and policies adopted by the Network Meeting. [...].'

63 Statutes art11 'THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND THE SECRETARIAT. (1) The Executive Secretary is the chief executive officer of the Organisation and the head of the Secretariat. The Executive Secretary shall serve as the secretary of the Steering Committee and shall report to and be responsible to the Steering Committee for the activities of the Secretariat. (2) The Executive Secretary shall be appointed by the Steering Committee for a period that shall not exceed five years, which may be subject to renewal. (3)The Executive Secretary shall: a) Implement the decisions of the Steering Committee; b) Execute instructions from the Chair relating to the Chair's position as head and spokesperson of the Network and the Organisation; c) Approve new Partners of the Network; d) Support the committees and groups established by the Steering Committee; e) Appoint such staff as may be required to carry out the objectives of the Network and the Organisation; f) Be responsible for the financial management and accounting of the Organisation; g) Be authorised to issue statements and enter into obligations in the

different from the picture sketched above. The chair is the '*spokesperson for the Network as well as the Organisation. The Chair represents the Network and the Organisation in all forums.*' The SC is the '*executive body of the Organisation is the Steering Committee. The Steering Committee develops, steers and organises the work of the Organisation and guides the co-operation between the Partners within the Network.*' The ex-sec '*implement[s] the decisions of the Steering Committee, execute[s] instructions from the Chair relating to the Chair's position as head and spokesperson of the Network and the Organisation.*'<sup>64</sup>

The founders probably tried to distinguish between the SC and the highest body of the organisation, the Sponsoring Partners. It can be questioned if the construct ever functioned that way? A semi-voluntary chair on a three year term, cannot develop the direction of the organisation and be the representative in all forums. An ex-sec needs to have the official- and moral space to do exactly that. It is the ex-sec, on a 5 year statutory term, that must invest in long-term relationships and provide the stability to the organisation.

#### Proposals:

- Adapt the Rules of Conduct (to become new by-laws) for the SC to clarify the role of the Chair, SC and ex-sec.
- Make the executive-secretary the main person responsible for high level stakeholder-management.
- Clarify in the new SC by-laws that the ex-sec does not hold voting rights in the SC but all other members do.

#### Proposals that require statutes change:

- Move the executing powers from the SC to the Executive-Secretary.
- Allow the executive-secretary to take up an official role in representation and stakeholder management.

## **2.6 Financial Partners**

The Financing Partners are not an official grouping for GWPO but have been functioning as an informal network that allowed for GWPO to reach all in one. It is officially non existing but unofficially very influential.

Forming a group with other donors to the same organisation is beneficial for the individual donor. They can complement each-other, share information such as evaluations and propose common directions for the funding receiving entity. FPs can make a fist together or hide behind each others back.

For the receiver such a group can have an advantage as well: organised regular relations, well informed donors, future looking conversations. But for that to work the beneficiary needs to be represented at the right level and, most important, be in good shape. For the GWPO this combined meeting might not always have been beneficial. A grouping of donors can limit the beneficiary from maintaining one-on-one contacts. Opinions formed by one donor are shared with another. It is more difficult to correct a perception in a group than in a one-on-one relationship. Currently the FPG seemed to function as an unofficial auditing committee. With its hand on the wallet it can summon the SC and the secretariat. The Financing Partners are all Western European and that should make the members of the FPG extra careful in weighing their role.

The sheer existence of the FPG might also have eroded the feeling of responsibility of members of the SC over the organisations budget. Why scrutinise the budget thoroughly if there are always the FGP, SIDAs control cycle and the Sponsoring Partners Meeting to take decisions? Three entities,

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*name of and on behalf of the Organisation within the scope of her or his mandate or as authorised by the Steering Committee;*

64 Both the 2014 Dalberg report (page 31 and further) and the 2021 McKenzie advise (page 9 and 10) dissect the responsibilities of Chair and ex-sec.

and if we include the secretariat four, that can point fingers at each other or wash their hands of the matter.

The strong position of the FPG might naturally come to an end soon. Its role is connected with the quickly eroding core funding. Donors that provide project funding formulate their demands differently. Therefore there is currently no need to formalise the FP-group within the governance structure. There continues to be a place for regular and collective conversation between GWPO and its donors as a gathering where the Theory of Change is being discussed; where all participants bring their knowledge to the table in an atmosphere of collective learning. RWPs should be invited to that table. For some RWPs it could be worthwhile to set up their own regular meeting with groupings of donors.

If the organisation continues to function within the current statutes, I propose to have one donor with full voting rights in the slimmed down SC.

#### Proposals:

- Include one donor into the SC with full voting rights. If that is not possible, recruit a treasurer on a personal capacity
- Invite RWPs in meetings between the GWPO and the FPG.

## **2.7 The Secretariat**

If the Network is the gem of GWP, building in structural cooperation and consultation is key. Lack of regular contact between the region and the organisation is Stockholm has come up in various conversations. A fast and easy solution to overcome that shortage of cooperation is to establish an extended Management Team that brings together the 13 executive secretaries / coordinators of the RWPs with the CEO, COO and CFO in Stockholm on a regular basis. That will give RWPs a structural voice in the global secretariat. To keep the size of the SC under control not all 13 GWP can be member at the same time. The ext-MT allows for continuation of the operation. The extended-MT can input into the annual plans and the further content discussions before these are brought before the SC. Implementation of programs will benefit from horizontal contacts between RWPs and regular contact on senior level enables Stockholm to adjust its services to the needs of the RWPs. By piloting this approach the GWP can test the water for official branches or antennas, without aiming for one-size-fits-all. This way the SC is fed more regularly with regional context.

#### Proposal:

- Form an extended MT between the RWPs and the Management in Stockholm giving RWPs a structural voice in the global secretariat.

## **2.8 Nominations Committee**

The mandate of the Nominations Committee (NC) is described in article 8 of the statutes. The SC appoints the 5 to 7 members of the NC. I have not found rules on the selection of members of the NC. The NC selects the members of the SC, the Chair, the external auditor and presents them for appointment to the SP. The nomination of the ex-sec is done directly by the SC.<sup>65</sup>

The by-laws of the NC are contradicting themselves. They are a compilation of rules that need to be moved elsewhere, working methods, toolboxes, time-tables and micromanagement. Three examples:

1. The rules of conduct of the SC prescribe that two of the NC members should be SC-member. I have not found clarity over the profile of the other 3 to 5 NC members, besides criteria of quality in an annex to the SC Rules of Conduct. Those actually say that a

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65 Statutes art8.

member of the NC cannot be a SC-member.<sup>66</sup>

2. The statutes state that the members of the NC are operating in private capacity<sup>67</sup>, but the composition of the NC for the selection of the Chair (yet another composition) prescribe the presence of two ex-officio members: the chair of regional chairs and the TEC chair.<sup>68</sup>
2. The NC by-laws prescribe that, if budget allows, the search for a Chair needs to be done with a professional search entity.<sup>69</sup> The budget restraints mentioned in the article limit the power of the rule. Last time around the external recruiter found a candidate that was already a member of the SC. It can be useful to work with a recruiter but these are by-laws not a a toolbox.

To underline the importance of the Partners Network as a General Assembly, the SC should do a public call in the Network for candidates for the NC, select candidates on the basis of quality and experience and bring the proposal for an NC-team of 3 to 5 people to the annual Network Meeting for a vote. The SC continues its role as selector of the NC-members but will move the installation of the committee to the NM. Members of the SC should not be eligible to be on the NC to avoid self-nomination. Preferably this is added to the mandate of the NM via statutes change, but it can be done without, through clarifying the working method in the by-laws for the NM and the SC.

The mandate of the NC should be one of a standing committee that is responsible for all search and selection of SC members, including the Chair and ex-sec. To respect the roles of the SC and SP the routing of the nominations will differ. The nomination for the ex-sec will first go to the SC for approval before being brought to the SP, respecting the current situation in which the SC is the Board and employer. The nominations for SC and Chair can be brought via the Network Meeting (as currently decreed by the Statutes) to the SP for installation.<sup>70</sup>

Various proposals in this report lead to a reduction of the workload of the NC, witch would allow to bring down the size of the NC to 3 to 5 members.

- the proposed reduction of the SC;
- the extended term of office for SC members (depending on statutes change) from 3 to 4 years;
- the direct representation of RWP-representatives.

The task of the NC can be further streamlined by taking out its role in selecting an external auditor. This is a public procurement exercise that is run by the secretariat and should be under supervision of the audit committee.

#### Proposals:

- Allow for the Network Meeting to appoint the members of the NC.
- Review the criteria for NC-members and move them to the NC by-laws.
- Strike the double membership of the SC and NC.
- Use one Nominations Committee for SC-members, Chair and executive-secretary.
- Move the composition of the SC to the Rules of Conduct of the SC.
- Lift the rule that the search for a chair needs to be done with an external recruiter.

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66 [Rules of conduct of the Steering Committee](#), annex 1.

67 Statutes art8.3.

68 By-laws NC, art 4.1.3 '*The NC is to establish an extended search committee composing the NC Chair, two NC members, the SC Vice -Chair, the Chair of Regional Chairs and one external person.*'

69 By-laws NC, art 4.1.5. '*The search committee will, subject to budgetary approval, work with a professional search entity. The search committee is to develop a shortlist of candidates, conduct interviews and identify a Chair for nomination to the SP.*'

70 Statutes art8, '*Nominations Committee [...] (5) The nominations shall be presented to the Partners at least three months before the Annual Meeting of the Sponsoring Partners. In order to receive widest possible support from the Partners, the Nomination Committee shall be prepared to modify its nominations in the light of comments by Partners. Nominations and relevant comments from Partners shall be presented to the Sponsoring Partners one month before the Annual Meeting when the appointments shall be made.*'

Proposals that require statutes change:

- Let the Network Meeting appoint the NC-members.
- Extend the term of office of the NC from 3 to 4 years equal to the proposed term for the SC.
- Move the selection of the external auditor to the SC audit committee.
- Bring down the size of the NC (currently 5 to 7) to 3 to 5 members.

## **2.9 Technical committee**

The Technical committee (TEC) is mentioned in various articles in the statutes and its chair has a role in the governance of the organisation. The TEC itself has not role in governance and is therefore reviewed in this report.

### 3. Conclusion

The changed role of GWP/GWPO should be reflected in its governance. In the past GWP was agenda setting. IWRM was a new concept and your role was to bring the world along. An international secretariat that interacts on the UN-level to kick start the debate and drum up support was needed. It has been a success. IWRM is widely accepted now and there are other actors on the world water stage. That is good for the cause but it demands from GWP to rethink its role. Implementation of IWRM on national and regional level has become more important. With that the role of the national and regional partners gained in importance, but it was not been reflected in the governance structure.

The current practice is top-down, but the implementation and fundraising need a bottom-up approach. Decolonisation is at the core of the international public debate. Networking is in fashion and GWP has the structure to benefit from that. It is time re-embrace the Network and let the regions take lead.

The Governance of GWP and GWPO has been complex from the beginning: a Network without legal status that has certain responsibilities towards a Secretariat with an IGO-status; RWP and CWP that lack legal status but function as the main executing bodies and a SC that hold a mixture of oversight and executing responsibilities. The piling up of by-laws, rules, working methods and the interpretation of all of those documents have not made it any better. Basic organisational hygiene has been missing for a long time. When times are good a non-functioning governance is not a problem. The bills are being paid and people get along, so why bother with the red-tape? When times are less rosy, sloppy governance holds you back. Rules are always there for bad times. The situation gets worse when governance is not following function.

I have been reluctant to advise on the revision of status of an intergovernmental organisation. Not a lot of thinking has gone into that status recently. It simply is a given. The Partners in the Network are appreciative of the IGO-status because it opens doors to their national authorities. Financing Partners question the costs that come with the staffing of an IGO-secretariat. It is the given mandate of the SP-Meeting that limits the empowerment of the Network, not the IGO-status itself. The Sponsoring Partners could agree to change the statutes to allow the Network Meeting to function as a General Assembly and hold the SC accountable. That will make it easier to lead the organisation and benefit from the IGO-status.

When the dust settles (with part of the governance change in place, a new executive-secretary appointed and the financial situation cleared up) the organisation will be in a better position to review the usefulness of the IGO-status.

The structure laid down in the statutes is resembling a catch 22 situation: difficult circumstance from which there is no escape because of mutually conflicting or dependent conditions. In theory you can change the statutes but in practice the participation of the various members of the governing bodies is too low to bring forward change.

To overcome this dilemma I have proposed changes that can be made within the current statutes. Through reinterpretation of these statutes and via overhauling the secondary arrangements in by-laws and rules of conduct, a lot can be done. The SC has full freedom to rewrite those.

Statutes change takes time. I advise the SC to start that process now by proposing changes to Network and Sponsoring Partners. Do not wait for these changes to be put in place to introduce new ways of working. The SC can modernise the governance right away by changing the secondary rules and regulations. Introducing clear representation in the SC and increased accountability to the Network Meeting will help regain trust with the Network-partners and the Financing Partners.

## 4. Proposals grouped per regulation or entity

The proposals for change made throughout the report are grouped per regulation or per entity. Links to the documents are provided in the literature list and annotated regulations can be found on the [google drive](#).

### 4.1 Proposals for Statutes Change

- Make the Steering-Committee more accountable to the partners by moving the final oversight role of the SP (approval of financial statements, the audit report, appointment of members of the SC) to the Network Meeting.
- Lower the size of the SC to 5 to 9 members.
- Prolong the term of office for members of the SC to 4 years.
- Change art7.5 to erase the rule that '*members of the Steering Committee shall serve in their personal capacity*' and allow for stronger representation of RWPs.
- Invite UN-Water to become a SP instead of a member in the SC.
- Move the executing powers from the SC to the Executive-Secretary.
- Allow the executive-secretary to take up an official role in representation and stakeholder management.
- Let the Network Meeting appoint the NC-members.
- Bring down the size of the NC (currently 5 to 7) to 3 to 5 members.
- Extend the term of office of the NC from 3 to 4 years equal to the proposed term for the SC.
- Move the selection of the external auditor to the SC audit committee.
- Move the acceptance of new Partners from the executive-secretary to the SC.

### 4.2 Proposals that do not need Statutes change

#### Network Meeting by-laws, proposals for change:

- Organise the Network Meetings according to the statutes: yearly. Conclude discussions with a minuted decision to grow a culture of accountability in the Network.
- Use the mandate of the SC to reformulate the rules of the Network Meeting to empower that meeting of partners, to make it function more like a general assembly.
- Allow for the Network Meeting to appoint the members of the NC.
- Let the SP-Meeting follow close to the NM.
- Organise an annual event of the year on latest developments attractive for a wide audience and combine it with a Network Meeting / General Assembly (where all oversight bodies meet consecutively).

#### Policy on Partners, proposals for change:

- Adapt the Policy on Partners to actively recognise the partnership status of CWP and RWPs and allow CWP's vote in the Network Meeting. Clarify why RWPs should not have voting rights.
- Decrease the South-North influence inequality through empowering CWP's involvement in the Network Meeting.
- Assist CWP and RWP with finding the legal status that suits them.
- Ask partners regularly to confirm partnership and proceed to cancellation after a three years of non-communication. Include this rule into the Policy on Partners.

#### Sponsoring Partners, proposals for change:

- Do not open up the current MoU if you want to continue as an intergovernmental

organisation.

- Explore the willingness of the SP to move oversight tasks to the Network Meeting.
- Enlarge the group of Sponsoring Partners with a priority on Africa.
- Invite UN-Water to become a SP instead of a member in the SC.
- Change perspective in the SP away from a supervisory board towards a General Assembly.
- Revamp relationships between the executive-secretary and the individual Sponsoring Partners at the level of the capitals.
- Improve frequency and intensity of the exchange between SC, SP and the HQ upscaling the conversation to strategy and policy.
- Consider formulating by-laws for the SP-Meeting to stipulate roles and procedures beyond the statutes.

#### Steering Committee Rules of Conduct, proposals for change:

- Review the rules of conduct for the SC, rename them by-laws to be in line with others internal arrangements and break them up into 2 different products: a) by-laws specifying the way of working and composition. b) a code of good-governance formulating ethics.
- Decrease the size of the SC to a maximum of 13 and propose this for decision to the next SP-Meeting.
- Include one donor into the SC with full voting rights. If that is not possible, recruit a treasurer on a personal capacity.
- Increase the frequency of (virtual) SC-Meetings.
- Include regular self-evaluation to the by-laws of the SC.
- Adapt the Rules of Conduct for the SC to clarify the role of the Chair, SC and ex-sec.
- Clarify in the new SC by-laws that the ex-sec does not hold voting rights in the SC but all other members do.
- Lift the composition the SC from the NC by-laws to the reviewed SC by-laws.
- Make the executive-secretary the main person responsible for high level stakeholder-management.
- Strike the double membership of the SC and NC.
- Exclude the SC-observers from the SC and find another forum to connect with them.

#### Nominations Committee by-laws, proposals for change:

- Allow for the Network Meeting to appoint the members of the NC.
- Use one Nominations Committee for SC-members, Chair and executive-secretary.
- Review the criteria for NC-members and move them to the NC by-laws.
- Move the composition of the SC to the rules of conduct of the SC.
- Erase art 3.1.5 that forbids officials of CWP and RWP to become member of the SC.
- Align the term of mandate of the chair of regional chairs (an ex-officio position representing all Regional Water Partnerships) with the other members by raising it from 2 to 3 years.
- Lift the rule that the search for a Chair needs to be done with an external recruiter.
- Strike the double membership of the SC and NC.

#### Secretariat, proposals for change:

- Invite RWPs in meetings between the GWPO and the FPG.
- Form an extended MT between the RWPs and the Management in Stockholm giving RWPs a structural voice in the global secretariat.

## List over interviewees

Name	Function
Pablo Bereciartua	Chair Steering Committee
Per Bertilsson	Executive-secretary/ CEO a.i
Abdoulaye Sene	Member Steering Committee and Chair of regional chairs
Jacques Rey	GWP adviser
Chris Ilagan	Member SC, Chair of GWP South East Asia
Howard Bamsey	Previous Chair Steering Committee
Alex Simalabwi	Executive-Secretary GWPSA
Klaus Leroch	Financing Partners group, MFA Austria
Atem S. Ramsundersingh	Member Steering Committee
Noémie Apollon	Legal and governance counsel, GWPO secretariat
Vangelis Constantianos	Executive-secretary GWP Med
Maarten Gischler	MFA The Netherlands, SP and FP.
Tobias Axerup	MFA Sweden Sponsoring Partner, host.
Niamh Brannigan	Head of Communications
Darko Manakovski	Head of Global Development
	Staff representation
Oyun Sanjaasuren	Chair Steering Committee 2016-2018
Tendai Gandanzara	Interim Chief Financial Officer
Ms Jaehyang So	TEC Chair
Silvia Cao	Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of Argentina, Stockholm
Stacy Swann	Former Steering Committee member
Themba Gumbo	Executive Director, Cap-Net
Maria van Berlekom and Maria Vink	SIDA, Financing Partner.

### Written answers received by:

#### CWP/ RWP

Benin CWP  
 Estonia GWP  
 Gambia CWP  
 Lithuania GWP  
 Lesotho CWP  
 Malaysia CWP  
 Nepal GWP  
 Pakistan WaterPartnership  
 Nigeria CWP  
 Sri Lanka WP  
 Zambia CWP

GWP Centro America

GWP SAS

#### Sponsoring Partners

Jordan, Ministry of Water and Irrigation  
 Netherlands, MFA  
 World Meteorological Organisation

#### Financing Partners

Netherlands, MFA  
 United Kingdom, FCDO  
 Switzerland, SCD  
 Germany, BMZ

#### RWPs

GWP SEA  
 GWP WAF

#### Steering Committee members

none beyond the interviewees

## Abbreviations

CWP Country water Partnerships  
DGIS Directorate-General for International Cooperation (NL)  
EC European Commission  
ES Executive Secretary  
FPG Financing Partners' Group  
FTE Full Time Equivalent  
GWP Global Water Partnership  
GWPO Global water Partnership Organisation  
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature  
IWRM Integrated Water Resources Management  
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
NC Nominations Committee  
NM Network Meeting  
RWP Regional Water Partnership  
SC Steering Committee  
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency  
SP Sponsoring Partner  
SPG Sponsoring Partners' Group  
TEC Technical Committee  
TOR Terms of Reference  
UK United Kingdom  
UN United Nations  
WB World Bank  
WMO World Meteorological Organisation

# Annexes and Literature

Documents with an asterisk \* are not freely available, but have been uploaded to a [google drive](#) unless they were not to be made public.

## Annexes (all on google drive)

- GWP Partners in The Netherlands checked against existance.\*
- Nominations Committee by-laws with proposals for change.\*
- Network Meeting by-laws, annotated.\*
- Policy for Partners with proposals for change, annotated.\*
- Rules of Conduct for SC with proposals for change.\*
- Statutes with proposals for change.\*

## Minutes

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Sponsoring Partners, minutes and participants lists, 2011-2023 ([mostly available on GWP website](#)).  
Steering Committee, minutes 2014- 2023 ([partly available on GWP website](#)).

## Rules and regulations

### [By-laws for the Nominations Committee](#)

Ex-Officio status within GWP's Steering Committee, memo by the legal counsel on request of the SC, March 11, 2023.\*

### [Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Global Water Partnership Organisation](#), 2002.

GWP/GWPO Governance, Crucial Defining Principles and Documents, November 2010.\*

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GWP-SC - GWP GOVERNANCE CHRONOLOGY 2011-2022, put together by the legal counsel.\*

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